TLabseminar
本次seminar我们有幸邀请到北京交通大学的鲍月教授为大家带来“Leaving the Tub: Regulating dynamic congestion externalities with tradable credit schemes: Does a unique equilibrium exist?”的学术报告，欢迎大家参会交流。
鲍月，北京交通大学交通运输学院教授，博士生导师，入选北京交通大学卓越百人计划（2020）。本科毕业于中国石油大学（华东），博士毕业于北京交通大学（2017），香港科技大学博士研究生访问学者（2014-2015），荷兰乌特勒支大学联合培养博士研究生（2015-2016），荷兰阿姆斯特丹自由大学博士后研究员（2017-2020）。研究领域包括城市交通需求管理，城市交通建模与优化，网络交通流建模，交通政策分析。博士毕业论文获评管理科学与工程学会优秀博士论文（2018），在Transportation Research Part A, B, E,F等交通领域国际期刊上发表多篇论文，以内参形式向国家自然科学基金委提出政策建议数次。
付晓，博士，副教授，硕士生导师。研究方向包括多模式交通网络分析与建模、基于活动的交通模拟、时空大数据等。
Leaving the Tub: Regulating dynamic congestion externalities with tradable credit schemes: Does a unique equilibrium exist?
Abstract：Tradable credit schemes offer a potentially efficient, revenue-neutral policy alternative to classical dynamic pricing of congestion externalities. We show in this paper that the resulting equilibrium may not be unique for particular models of congestion, including the first-best solution for the conventional Vickrey's bottleneck model. This can have substantial detrimental impacts on social welfare and social acceptance of tradable credit schemes. The reason underlying this result is that the credit supply-demand condition can be satisfied for a continuum of credit prices. This is because any marginal change in the credit price will be matched by a compensating change in queuing times, keeping user price fixed but deviating from the first-best optimum in which no queueing should occur. We find that the problem of non-uniqueness does not occur for the dynamic flow congestion model proposed by Chu. A unique equilibrium can be obtained in the bottleneck model if the buying and selling of credits with a bank is allowed, against a pre-determined price. Credits are then still tradable so that the use can deviate from the initial distribution, but the credit price is determined by the perfectly elastic demand and supply from the bank.
时间：2021/05/28 （周五） 19:00-20:30线上参会方式：腾讯会议 ID: 792 3960 7467
